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Abstract
The development and evolution of malware including computer viruses,
worms, and trojan horses, is shown to be closely analogous to the pro-
cess of community succession long recognized in ecology. In particular,
both changes in the overall environment by external disturbances, as well
as, feedback effects from malware competition and antivirus coevolution
have driven community succession and the development of different types
of malware with varying modes of transmission and adaptability. Key-
words: Ecology, computer virus, community succession, artificial life
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1 Introduction
The existence of malware has been almost synonymous with the progress of
the personal computer revolution. First, came tentative theories in science
fiction works such as The Shockwave Rider by John Brunner [Brunner, 1975] or
Neuromancer by William Gibson [Gibson, 1984]. Next were the first proofs of
concept by Xerox PARC researchers John Schoch and Jon Hupp. Finally, the
first real “wild” virus known as Brain emerged in 1986, created by two brothers
in Pakistan [Spafford et. al., 1989]. Since that time, malware has continued to
grow and evolve becoming both a nuisance and a threat. Most recently, it has
also become a damaging form of international crime costing $113 billion in 2013
according to estimates by Symantec [Symantec, 2013] .
Since the very first use of biological analogies such as virus and worm
to describe these programs, the analogies and links between computer epi-
demiology and that of biological epidemics have not gone unnoticed. Indeed,
discussions of viruses as artificial life and their similarities to real epidemics
are widespread [Kephart & White, 1991, Pastor-Satorras & Vespignani, 2001,
Newman et. al., 2002, Balthrop, J. et. al., 2004, Serazzi & Zanero, 2004]. His-
torically, the most detailed research on computer malware has relied either
on simulating epidemics to match or revise widely known epidemic models
such as the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model or Susceptible-Infected-
Susceptible (SIS) model [Kephart & White, 1991, Pastor-Satorras & Vespignani, 2001]
or using theoretical methods and simulation to estimate the epidemic thresholds
(or lack thereof) on computer network topologies [Pastor-Satorras & Vespignani, 2001,
May & Lloyd, 2001].
Many papers have also discussed malware qualitatively in an ecological sense
[Crandall et. al., 2008]. This paper will attempt to add to this discussion by
presenting quantitative results and analyses of the evolution of malware over the
past 25 years in order to argue that much of malware development can be under-
stood in terms of community succession and that its progressive developments
have mirrored succession dynamics in biological ecosystems.
2 Malware types and their evolution
To begin our discussion of malware ecology, we must first define malware. Mal-
ware is a general term that encompasses a wide variety of malicious programs
that can be said to operate on or against computer systems for ulterior motives
not approved of or even recognized by users or standard software. Malware
encompasses all of the commonly recognized exploits such as computer viruses,
worms, trojan horses, and even lesser known malicious programs such as adware
and spyware. The main types of malware that will be discussed in this paper,
however, are the four most common over the last 25 years shown in Table 1.
Granted, these definitions are not always completely mutually exclusive.
There can be malware that incorporates aspects of each. For example, a trojan
that infects a computer from an email and then proceeds to spread itself on re-
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Malware
Type
Transmission Method Approximate
Origin Year
Percent of
infections in
2013
Computer
Virus
Self-replication and passive spread
through infection of computer files
1986 9%
Trojan
(Horse)
Spread through user’s activities
with files or Internet; not self-
replicating
1989 87%
Macro Virus Self-replication and active spread
using Microsoft Office and other
software products’ macros
1996 0%
Worm Self-replication and active spread
across media and networks seeking
new and unknown hosts
1998 4%
Table 1: Major malware types used in the paper, their method of transmission,
approximate year of origin and percentage of malware detected by Symantec’s
Threat Report system in 2013.
movable media in computer virus-like fashion. However, these four definitions,
when considering the main method of transmission, can encompass the vast ma-
jority of malware now in existence. In addition to the malware types, malware
can be classified into ‘families’ which begin with a single strain but can grow to
collectively contain many ‘variants’ which are new versions of the original strain
or code sample. Most malware named in the popular press are families which
can have an increasing number of variants as new versions are released to evade
security software or exploit new vulnerabilities.
Over time, however, different types of malware have grown, become predom-
inant, and then declined. The actual number of computers infected by different
types of malware is extremely difficult to estimate, even with a relatively eas-
ily detectable worm such as Conficker [Conficker Working Group, 2009]. The
estimates of malware infection often depend on either statistics reported from
computer security and antivirus products or the monitoring of Internet traffic
easily attributable to malicious code over network links. The former method
runs into issues of sample size and bias that are difficult to correct while the lat-
ter relies on distinguishing malware traffic from all other legitimate traffic with
similar features, not always an easy task. Worldwide, about 83% of computers
have antivirus software [McAfee, 2012] but it is unknown how many of these
actively provide information back to the vendor,additionally, this install base is
divided across many different vendors. This leads to other issues such as sam-
ple biases where corporate networks or personal computers of certain national
or demographic groups are likely overrepresented. Much malware likely lurks
with those users not sophisticated enough or without access to actively updated
security products.
While overall population estimates are difficult to determine, a proxy for
the popularity of types of malware can be found in the creation of new malware
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of each type, and their derivative variants. Malware writers are an adaptable
group and through time the introduction of different types of malware is in-
timately related to the success of that type of malware in exploiting system
weaknesses, transmission, and accomplishing the malware writer’s aims. The
emergence of new variants by type is relatively easier to measure and while
there are still sample size and bias issues, counting new variants only requires
proof of existence and not sample size dependent on easily biased statistical
measures such as population sizes and statistical moments. Detection by an
antivirus system and subsequent reporting as well as “honeypots” established
by security researchers end up corralling a large portion of all malicious code
and definitely most malware that has been able to successfully spread across
multiple computers and networks.
The dates of the first appearance of these new variants, while they may
vary somewhat in time as reported by different groups, are relatively easy to
pinpoint given the short generation time and rapid spread of successful malware.
Therefore, the dates of first detection, grouped within a quarterly (three month
basis) provide and accurate designation for the age of different malware variants.
3 Data Sources & Methodology
To measure the succession of different types of malware over time, this paper will
use data on the emergence of malware variants, grouped by type, over time on
a quarterly basis. This data is available, in various degrees of granularity, from
most large antivirus vendors but the data from the Symantec Threat definitions
[Symantec, 2014] and their annual security reports are used as the primary
sources of data for this study.
In the online Threat Definitions, Symantec lists the most common malware
families and their major variants by name, type, and often date of first detection.
Not all families are listed with data, but for those that were, the data accessed
on April 18, 2014 listed a total of 13,599 families and major variants detected
over all time. Of these about 44% were classified primarily as a type of Trojan,
23% were classified primarily as worms, 13% as computer or macro viruses, and
20% as other types of malware. However, on a deeper analysis this list was
found to have several features that require revision for a usable dataset.
Notably, were missing detection dates for malware, primarily amongst earlier
emerging viruses (before 2000). These were filled in from other sources where
data was available (see Appendix). In addition, for clarity, malware counts
were only used when they had one, clear definition. Thus a designation such
as ‘Trojan Virus’ which indicates a program introduced as a Trojan Horse but
subsequently spreading as a virus, was excluded from the overall count of Tro-
jans.
Most impactful, however, was the change in methodology of how threats were
tracked over time. Earlier antivirus programs relied on frequently updated lists
of exact malware threats to search for and clean. However, with the rapid explo-
sion in malware from 2006 on, where new variants rapidly emerged due to new
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techniques designed to obfuscate the signature of the malware, new threat def-
initions emerged which were not tailored for specific named variants but rather
were generic algorithms to search for common types of threats using heuristic
algorithms. This was acknowledged by Symantec as a reason for the drop in
number of new Win32 (targeting 32-bit Microsoft Windows operating system)
malware variants detected from 2006 on [Symantec, 2006]. Therefore, these
heuristic algorithm threat definitions, such as Bloodhound and Packed.Generic,
could not be counted identically to named variants in accounting for the emer-
gence of distinct new malware threats and had to be removed.
One key mistake to not make in enumerating variants of malware is to as-
sume that metamorphic or polymorphic code, malware that can mutate its code
as it reproduces, creates new variants. Mutations as they are currently known
in malware are used to hide the malware from antivirus detection. While the
overall mutation engine of the malware changes the fitness of the malware vari-
ant versus others in its family and type, the mutations themselves are more like
silent mutations in genetics since they do not confer additional incremental fit-
ness to the malware program and do not create new variants. All new variants
so far found have been human designed.
Finally, the data is limited in that not all malware can easily be turned into
a named variant for a definition file. In particular, there was an explosion in web
exploits from 2006 on, and web threats, which often involve malicious scripts on
websites and other specially tailored code, are not easily assigned as a named
threat for a definition file. While general techniques such as cross-scripting can
be protected against using more comprehensive “Internet Security” solutions
rather than just antivirus software, they are not as easily enumerated as other
traditional type of threats. As reflected in Figure 1, the emergence of web
threats along with the use of heuristic algorithms causes what seems to be a
contradictory trend in the data on new threat emergence where there is a sharp,
but brief dip in new threat emergence in 2006.
3.1 Final data set
With the changes made as described above, a final data set was created with the
following attributes: N=8,530 different families and major variants classified as
one of the four types in Table 1. Each has a date of first detection from either
Symantec or another named source (see appendix). The dates range from the
Brain virus in 1986 to the latest threats of the fourth quarter of 2013. Data
from 2014 was removed since trend data indicated it was largely incomplete
and showed a marked decrease in overall number of threats from earlier periods,
likely due to a lag in reporting new threats publicly.
4 Analysis of Malware Over Time
In Figure 1, the evolution of malware threats over time is shown both as a graph
of the total number of new threats per quarter as well as the proportion of all
5
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Figure 1: The number of new malware threats by type over time from 1986 to
2013 and the share of new malware threats by each type over the same period.
Colors for each malware type are red for computer viruses, green for Trojans,
blue for macro viruses, and orange for worms.
new threats represented by each type of malware per quarter. As is initially
strikingly clear, malware has gone through multiple stages where different types
of malware have been most prominent at different times.
Both metrics are valuable, though proportion is likely more so. Because of
the unknown bias in sampling, coverage of Symantec’s threat data, etc. the
actual count, while probably accurate, cannot be considered complete. Further,
the families and variants named are only those which Symantec thought were
important enough to name and give a date. Proportion on the other hand allows
us to measure the relative strength and popularity of each malware type relative
to the others across time. As long as there are no huge gaps that bias detection
of one type of malware over another, these proportions are probably relatively
accurate.
Using the proportion data, it is clearly seen that there are several key stages
in malware evolution. In the first, from 1986 to about 1996, computer viruses,
particularly the disk boot sector virus, ran the show. There was the occasional
Trojan as well but the default method of transmission, via infected floppy disk,
did not change much over time. Starting in 1996, with the introduction of
macros, short programs for routine functions, in Microsoft Office, a new form of
virus emerged: the macro virus. By executing malicious code within Microsoft
Office it could cause havoc, as well as spread itself through channels such as
disks or emails via the infected computer’s Outlook address book. The macro
virus burst on the stage and rapidly grew to become the fastest increasing threat
of that time and briefly the largest source of new infections.
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The years 1998 to 2002 stand out as an era of great diversity amongst mal-
ware and a lack of dominance by any type. The computer worm, which actively
propagated itself without user intervention or the need of a specialized program
like MS Office, debuted in 1998 and spread rapidly with several large, global
infections such as Code Red, Slammer, and Nimda. Viruses continued to play a
major role though one of their main vectors of propagation was in rapid decline
with the coming obsolescence of the floppy disk.
The quantitative measure of malware diversity during this time can be seen
in Figure 2 where the diversity is measured as the Hill Number based on the
proportion of new malware by each type every quarter. Hill Numbers have
been shown to be one of the best and most consistent indicators for diversity
[Hill, 1973, Jost, 2006, Chao et. al., 2010]. The basic Hill Numbers of order a
are defined as
Na = (p
a
1 + p
a
2 . . .+ p
a
n)
1/(1−a) (1)
In equation 1, p is the proportion of each species by number of individuals
(or dry mass for plants) to the entire community population while a represents
the order of the Hill Number. Different orders represent different aspects of
the population where a = 0 is the number of species, a = 1 the diversity, and
the inverse of a = 2 is Simpson’s number. Hill showed in [Hill, 1973] that the
Hill numbers are in effect the Re´nyi entropy of order a. In this paper the Hill
number for a = 1 is used and is calculated as
N1 = exp
( 4∑
i=1
−pi log pi
)
(2)
As can be seen in Figure 2, the diversity of the malware ecosystem surged
from 1998 forward peaking between 2000 and 2002. The proportion of each type
of malware is roughly equal over this time period. From 2002 on, however, the
diversity begins a slow decline. The first reason is the rapid extinction of the
macro virus. Security features in the Microsoft Office products such as prompts
before the automatic execution of macros and improvements in antivirus soft-
ware to detect macro virus threats made macro viruses much less dangerous
and more difficult to propagate. Ten years after their debut, in 2006, they
disappeared entirely as a major source of malware.
The second reason, alluded to previously, was the decline of floppy disks.
This eliminated one of the main vectors for computer viruses and they declined
accordingly. They would recover, with the ability to exploit media such as USB
keys or mobile devices, but would never again be the dominant force they had
been in the early days of personal computing.
The field was largely left to both worms and trojans. Worms, however,
began their own long-term decline starting in 2007-2008. Many of the major
worm epidemics had relied on major security vulnerabilities in operating sys-
tems or software to infect other computers and propagate. The security flaw
in the Microsoft 2000 Server IIS (Internet Information Server) was a key fac-
tor in the incredibly rapid spread of Code Red. In addition, the nature of
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Figure 2: Graph of the diversity of new malware across the four main types
over time from 1986 until the end of 2013. Diversity is calculated using the Hill
numbers where a=1.
the Internet topology, with a power law or scale-free distribution of connec-
tions, made it so that there was theoretically almost no epidemic threshold
[Pastor-Satorras & Vespignani, 2001, May & Lloyd, 2001]. With the plugging
of these vulnerabilities as well as improved antivirus detection and removal pro-
grams, massive worm epidemics became a thing of the past. One of the last
major epidemics, and one of the worst, were the Conficker worms which peaked
in 2008.
From this point, the malware diversity continued its slow decline until reach-
ing levels last seen in 1997. Trojans are by far the major source of new mal-
ware, partially because of their flexibility in relying on targeting specific user
behaviors and programs rather than system wide attacks like viruses or worms.
In addition, their range of forms may make it so that the Trojan category is
overused to describe all types of malware that do not propagate between users.
Trojans have also become dominant since they are a key method of committing
cybercrime such as creating botnets, stealing account or password information,
or installing ’ransomware’ that causes computer malfunction until a ransom is
paid as directed by the software.
4.1 Malware ecology and community succession
Community succession is one of the most widely known and studied processes
in ecology. It is defined as the temporal change in species composition over
time in a fixed geographic area. In succession, the mix of species in a similar
geography evolves over time due to both external disturbances such as natural
disasters or man-made destruction as well as due to changes in the environment
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by prior species. In community succession, the ecology of the community evolves
in several general stages.
1. Primary Succession - Where a group of species colonizes a previously un-
inhabited (i.e. new) geographic area
2. Secondary Succession - The arrival and colonization of new groups of
species after a disturbance has largely removed the primary colonization
species. These new species can take advantage of the environment as it
has been changed by the primary species
3. Additional successions can also occur given environmental variables or
invading species.
A classic example of community succession was given by the succession of
plant life on and around the Bikini and Enewetak Atolls after the thermonu-
clear weapons tests beginning in 1954 [Held, 1960, Palumbo, 1961, Reese, 1987,
Donaldson et. al., 1997]. In [Held, 1960, Palumbo, 1961], Held and Palumbo
describe how the initial blast eliminated almost all vegetation but that shrubs
had reappeared within two years time, mainly from seeds or old stumps of
Scaevola frutescens and Messerschmidia argentea. In [Reese, 1987], the trees
Pisonia Grandis are mentioned as often replacing coconut palms, particularly
after the devastation of a typhoon or nuclear test.
Malware has followed a similar pattern from the origin of the first virgin,
ecological environment, the early personal computer, and its ability to share
data through floppy boot disks. The rise of viruses on personal computers
also led to the rise and coevolution of antivirus software. Computer viruses
responded in ways that pointed to increasing sophistication such as polymorphic
and metamorphic code, which mutated code to block antivirus software looking
for signatures, and encryption. With the rise of new technologies such as macros
and the Internet, additional avenues for propagation became available.
This secondary succession of macro viruses, worms, and trojans was based
on the previous success of the development of advanced computer virus code in
addition to new technology. However, the spectacular success of some macro
viruses and worms led to their destruction since the software and antivirus
vendors were able to respond to and close these powerful, though very specific,
software vulnerabilities leading to their decline. Macro viruses, in particular
were destroyed by the removal of their specific niche in productivity software
macros when automatic script execution was prevented and other safeguards
put into place. Similarly, the progress of technology that allowed secondary
succession obsoleted the floppy boot disk and eliminated a main niche of the
boot sector virus.
5 Conclusion
The diversity amongst malware has gone through several stages which mirror an
ecological succession in ecosystems. From starting with only boot sector com-
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puter viruses in the 1980s, the numbers and diversities rapidly rose through the
early 2000 era as macro viruses, worms, and trojans were introduced. Changes
in the environment, often brought on by the very success of advanced malware,
began to eliminate niches for those such as macro viruses or epidemic worms
while changes in data transfer practices with the end of floppies severely re-
stricted traditional computer viruses. While the current environment seems
dominated by Trojans, this is largely due to them having one of the more user
targeted and heterogeneous approaches of all malware. This makes large-scale
patches and other mass fixes less effective and allows Trojans to perpetuate for
a long time. In fact, the decline in malware type diversity likely masks a broader
intra-Trojan diversity.
This does not necessarily herald the end of malware innovation. Several
trends are likely to manifest in the future altering the landscape yet again:
1. The increasing use of mobile devices, tablets, home and car automation,
and the broader Internet of things will provide a fertile environment for
malware with multiple methods of propagation and flexibility across de-
vices. This has not yet extensively been seen in regular malware but is
one of the features of recent suspected state-developed malware such as
Stuxnet.
2. Continued blurring of lines between malware types as propagation meth-
ods and key techniques are shared and integrated into new types of mal-
ware.
3. The ability of malware to undergo non-user directed evolution. Whereas
polymorphic and metamorphic code currently only increases malware fit-
ness by the skill of the mutation engine, a dangerous development in future
malware may be the ability undergo mutations similar to biological pro-
cesses where the mutation alters the function of the malware itself and
thus changes its fitness with each mutation.
4. The former point would accelerate the development of advanced antivirus
software beyond heuristics to a more adaptive detection system similar to
immune response in biological systems.
Therefore, the current low diversity and development of new types are likely a
brief interlude and not the end of the story.
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A Appendix - Other Sources of Dates
Source Location
Patricia Hoffman’s Virus Informa-
tion Summary List (VSUM)
wiw.org/~meta/vsum
WildList Organization International wildlist.org
Antivirus DownloadAtoZ Virus Def-
initions
antivirus.downloadatoz.com
Wikipedia www.wikipedia.org
McAfee www.mcafee.com
H.J. Highland “A History of Com-
puter Viruses”
Highland, H.J. (1997). “Special feature: A
history of computer viruses - Introduction.”
Computers and Security, 16:5, 412-415
Virus Information (wikia) virus.wikia.com
Fauzi, “A Study on Computer
Viruses. . . ”
Fauzi, Mohd, Sanim, Shukor (2003) A study
on computer viruses attacks and the way
to cure them / Shukor Sanim Mohd Fauzi.
Bachelor Degree thesis, Universiti Teknologi
MARA (UiTM).
Virus Information Update CIAC
(Computer Incident Advisory Capa-
bility)
ciac.llnl.gov
The Security Digest SecurityDigest.org
Risks Digest www.risks.org
Lower Columbia College Y2K
Viruses List
www.lcc.ctc.edu/info/y2k/y2kvirus.xtm
CA Associates Anti-Spyware www.pestpatrol.com
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